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There has been great interest in compara-
tive cognitive science in a suite of behaviors
that have come to be subsumed under
the term “self-control.” Historically in
comparative psychology self-control was
defined behaviorally as the choice of a
larger or better but more delayed rein-
forcer over a smaller or less preferred but
less delayed reinforcer (Rachlin and Green,
1972; Ainslie, 1974; Grosch andNeuringer,
1981; Logue, 1988). More recently, how-
ever, self-control has been discussed more
in terms of being a capacity or ability
rather than a behavioral pattern, even to
the extent of some researchers suggest-
ing that self-control may be a limited
capacity resource that can be depleted,
strengthened, or improved with practice
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007). A termino-
logical morass has emerged in this area,
with varying definitions of this term, as
well as other perhaps related terms such as
patience, willpower, delay of gratification,
and intertemporal choice. The goal here
is not to untangle that mess of terminol-
ogy, but to comment on two recent papers
in comparative psychology that attempted
to provide insights into the “evolution of
self-control,” with varying degrees of suc-
cess. I also will provide the beginnings of a
framework for a terminology for assessing
these behavioral forms of self-regulation
and inhibition.
In one new paper, Stevens (2014) dis-
cussed the role that ecologically valid
tests play in understanding the evolu-
tion of self-control (also Stevens et al.,
2005a,b). These tests are excellent ways
of looking at how animals value time,
distance, and outcome options, and they
remind us that ultimately the behavior
we see in laboratory tests should relate
to the pressures a given species might
face in the natural environment. Stevens
(2014) also addressed three competing
hypotheses that might predict basic wait-
ing times in an intertemporal choice task
in which there is a choice between a
smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later
reward. Presumably, waiting longer is evi-
dence of self-control because one obtains
more reward, but at the cost of tolerating
the delay. The body size hypothesis predicts
that larger species should wait longer than
smaller species because of allometric rela-
tionships that describe how morphologi-
cal, physiological and behavioral measures
scale with body size (Schmidt-Nielsen,
1984). According to this hypothesis (some-
times also called the metabolic hypoth-
esis; Tobin and Logue, 1994), smaller
animals have faster metabolic rates, and
thus should tend to choose shorter delay
periods to any food relative to animals
with larger bodies (see Speakman, 2005).
Lifespan also scales with body size, and
thus longer living animals should have
longer waiting times than shorter living
animals according to this hypothesis. The
cognitive ability hypothesis predicts that
longer wait times would relate to generally
higher levels of cognition across species.
This hypothesis directly links to the emerg-
ing findings in human psychology that
good delay of gratification and high self-
control are predictive of more positive
life outcome measures (e.g., higher edu-
cation achievements) that also relate to
general intelligence (e.g., Duckworth and
Seligman, 2005; Shamosh et al., 2008). As a
proxy for general cognitive abilities across
primate species, Stevens (2014) used rel-
ative and absolute brain size, measures
that have shown clear relations with other
aspects of primate cognition (e.g., Gibson
et al., 2001; Deaner et al., 2007). Finally,
the social brain hypothesis predicts that
species that live in more complex groups
of many individuals should wait longer
than those that live in less complex groups.
This is because these individuals need to
more often employ inhibitory strategies as
they monitor and engage in social events
occurring around them such as tracking
the fission and fusion events within the
group (Dunbar, 2009), and some previous
research seems to support this hypothesis
(Amici et al., 2008).
To assess these hypotheses in terms
of their ability to predict intertemporal
choices, Stevens (2014) calculated mean
values for indifference points between
smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL)
rewards as the measure of self-control.
He also used data for each species for
body mass, measures of brain volume,
home range size, lifespan, and group size.
What he found was that the allomet-
ric variables predicted the ability to wait
for delayed rewards across 13 species of
primates. Specifically, he found that a
composite allometric factor that included
body mass, absolute brain size, lifespan
and home range size predicted waiting
times. Relative brain size and social group
size did not, and thus he concluded that
certain selective pressures have acted to
shape intertemporal choices made by ani-
mals. He noted that one limitation of
his study involved the methods used to
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measure intertemporal choice. Although
those methods were fairly consistently
applied across the studies he analyzed,
these intertemporal choice tasks may not
specifically have assessed self-control vs.
other decision mechanisms.
Using a different approach, MacLean
et al. (2014) assessed 567 animals repre-
senting 36 species on two tasks. In the A-
not-B task, subjects first learned that food
was always in one location from a choice
array, but then it was moved in the last trial
while the animal watched the item move.
If animals searched in the usual location
instead of switching to the new location
this was considered an error, and it sug-
gested that the animals could not control
their response to the old location in order
to reach toward the new one. In the cylin-
der task, subjects first found a piece of
food hidden inside an opaque cylinder and
had to reach around the side to retrieve
it. Then, a transparent cylinder was shown
instead of the opaque cylinder. Subjects
still had to reach around the cylinder to
grab the food rather than reaching for the
food as they saw it through the transparent
cylinder. Direct reaches that were blocked
by the cylinder were considered errors.
Absolute brain volume best predicted per-
formances of these species in successfully
obtaining the rewards. Social group size
was not a strong predictor of species dif-
ferences. MacLean et al. (2014) suggested
that these results implicated evolution-
ary relationships between dietary breadth,
absolute brain volume, and self-control.
Although I applaud the effort to pro-
vide such a comprehensive comparative
database, this conclusion does not provide
insights to the evolution of self-control.
Rather, MacLean et al. (2014) assessed one
form of behavioral inhibition (a construct
which itself can be viewed asmultifaceted),
and not self-control, at least as it is tradi-
tionally defined, and as I suggest it should
be defined.
I do not have space here for an exhaus-
tive framework to incorporate the behav-
ioral data that are being generated and
discussed in papers such as MacLean et al.
(2014) and Stevens (2014). Instead, I want
to focus on generating a framework for
what should (and what should not) be
called self-control. I define self-control
as the ability or capacity to obtain an
objectively more valuable outcome rather
than an objectively less valuable outcome
though tolerating a longer delay or a
greater effort requirement in obtaining
that more valuable outcome. A self-control
task has three essential features. First,
there must be at least two known options
available, and each must be available to
the subject through differential responses.
Second, those options each must be valu-
able to some extent but must be differ-
entially preferred by the subject, if all
else is the same. Third, there must be a
cost (generally in terms of time delay, but
also perhaps in terms of effort exerted)
for obtaining the more preferred out-
come. Self-control tasks are thus tasks that
require decisions, not just inhibition of
prepotent responses.
By this definition, self-control and
behavioral inhibition are not synonymous.
Rather, self-control such as that assessed
in inter-temporal choice tasks or delay
of gratification tasks is but one form of
behavioral inhibition, although I would
argue it is one of the most advanced and
most challenging forms for many species
and many individuals within a species.
The critical point is that a task requiring
behavioral inhibition does not necessarily
require self-control, and that this error in
our use of terminology has had distracting
effects on what we can say about self-
control and its evolutionary emergence in
nonhuman animals and humans. And, as
pointed out by one of the reviewers of this
article, some circumstances that require
increased activity rather than inhibition to
obtain the better outcome require self-
control (for example, choosing to work
longer for more pay rather than leaving
work early).
Self-control also is not synonymous
with delay of gratification. Delaying grat-
ification is what one does in a sub-
set of instances in which self-control is
employed. Delayed gratification tasks such
as the Marshmallow test (e.g., Mischel
and Ebbesen, 1970) are self-control tasks
because any task that requires a subject to
do nothing but wait, toward the goal of
getting a bigger or better outcome, meets
the three features outlined above. There
is the available reward (e.g., one marsh-
mallow now) and the later reward for
which one must wait (e.g., two marsh-
mallows later). If there was no wait-
ing period, the second option would be
preferred in general because it is big-
ger or better (e.g., 2 vs. 1 marshmal-
low). And, there is a time cost imposed
for obtaining that larger or better reward.
Intertemporal choice tasks such as those
in the Stevens (2014) paper also are self-
control tasks, although onemust be careful
about how to interpret some intertempo-
ral choice tasks that make use of point-
ing responses toward food rewards. Those
testing approaches may lead to overesti-
mates of self-control, as recently demon-
strated in capuchin monkeys using the
Hybrid Delay task (Paglieri et al., 2013).
In that task, subjects first chose between
an SS option and an LL option. If they
chose the LL option, they had to wait for
items to accumulate, one by one, within
reach, and the accumulation ended when
any items were eaten. This task assessed
objective errors in which the LL option
was selected but the accumulation was
terminated before enough items were col-
lected to match what the SS option had
offered. Capuchin monkeys made many
such errors although chimpanzees showed
better self-control by often choosing the
LL option but also waiting for it to accu-
mulate fully (Beran et al., 2014). Other
tasks that meet the criteria for assessing
self-control include delayed exchange tasks
(e.g., Dufour et al., 2007; Pele et al., 2010),
accumulation tasks (Beran, 2002; Beran
and Evans, 2006), some token collection or
exchange tasks (Jackson and Hackenberg,
1996; Hackenberg and Vaidya, 2003; Judge
and Essler, 2013), and similar approaches
(e.g., Evans and Westergaard, 2006; Evans,
2007; Bramlett et al., 2012).
Critically, one must then recognize
what are not self-control tasks. A-not-B
tasks, inhibitory motor tasks, flanker tasks,
Stroop tasks, Go No-Go tasks, and oth-
ers of this general form do not fall under
the umbrella of self-control assessment.
They can be tasks that require degrees of
behavioral inhibition, and thus are highly
relevant to understanding aspects of cog-
nitive control and self-regulation. But, not
all forms of behavioral inhibition rely on
self-control. For example, Maclean et al.’s
(2014) cylinder task requires inhibiting
reaching directly toward the food, but
there is no second option for getting
less food more quickly, and no deci-
sion between two temporal durations (or
effort levels) and two outcomes, one of
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which might be better now, but the other
of which is better in the long term.
Thus, MacLean et al. (2014), despite their
title, instead have assessed the evolution
of certain forms of behavioral inhibition
and motoric self-regulation in animals–
not self-control. One should applaud the
impressive efforts to provide a truly com-
parative approach to studying different
forms of behavioral inhibition. But Stevens
(2014) has provided clearer information
on the evolution of self-control, and a
stronger road map for future research on
this issue.
Much work remains to be done to
understand self-control capacities in non-
human species. For example, there are
concerns about exactly what different tasks
involving intertemporal choice measure
not only for nonhuman animals (e.g.,
Addessi et al., 2013) but also for humans
(Duckworth and Kern, 2011). And, as
Stevens (2014) noted, we need more cross-
species assessments using some of the
other methods that are designed to mea-
sure self-control such as delay of gratifi-
cation tasks (e.g., Grosch and Neuringer,
1981; Beran et al., 1999), delayed exchange
tasks (e.g., Dufour et al., 2007; Pele et al.,
2010; Judge and Essler, 2013), accumula-
tion tasks (Beran, 2002; Evans and Beran,
2007; Vick et al., 2010; Parrish et al.,
2014), and other variations on these meth-
ods. With those data, one could com-
pare the resulting correlations between
performance and allometric factors to
see if they match what Stevens found
for the intertemporal choice task. This
approach would provide a strong assess-
ment of the evolution of self-control as
it relates to the suite of tasks and cir-
cumstances in which self-control abilities
would be necessary for maximizing out-
comes. Hopefully, future discussions of the
behaviors (and underlying capacities and
mechanisms) of animals in situations that
require different forms of inhibition will
carefully consider what the appropriate
level of interpretation should be, other-
wise we run the risk of reducing all forms
of inhibition to being the same as self-
control.
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